words-how we are able to do something, and implicit, in which we are unaware of how (or even unaware that) we are doing something. Most cognitive science is devoted to discovering the implicit (unconscious) mechanisms underlying our cognitive competence and making them explicit. 2 Conscious introspection does not reveal what they are. The explanatory goal of cognitive science is to reverse-engineer what it takes to pass the Turing Test. That is, once we can successfully design a system that is capable of doing whatever any normal person can do, indistinguishably from any person, to any person, then we have a candidate explanation of how the human brain does it. 3 In modeling human cognitive capacity, we must consider what to build into our candidate mechanism and what to offload onto external cognitive technology, such as Google Web searches. Word meanings can be internally represented in two ways: sensorimotor and verbal. The latter can be offloaded, the former cannot.
S o c i e t y o n l i n e , P a r t 2 words-how we are able to do something, and implicit, in which we are unaware of how (or even unaware that) we are doing something. Most cognitive science is devoted to discovering the implicit (unconscious) mechanisms underlying our cognitive competence and making them explicit. 2 Conscious introspection does not reveal what they are. The explanatory goal of cognitive science is to reverse-engineer what it takes to pass the Turing Test. That is, once we can successfully design a system that is capable of doing whatever any normal person can do, indistinguishably from any person, to any person, then we have a candidate explanation of how the human brain does it. 3 In modeling human cognitive capacity, we must consider what to build into our candidate mechanism and what to offload onto external cognitive technology, such as Google Web searches. Word meanings can be internally represented in two ways: sensorimotor and verbal. The latter can be offloaded, the former cannot.
Offloading Cognition onto the Web
The Turing Test compares human and machine to determine whether the machine's performance capacity is distinguishable from the human's. In the online era, increasingly powerful cognitive technology is available for people to enhance their performance capacity and help them do what they formerly had to do in their heads. It is becoming possible to offload more and more cognitive processing onto cognitive technology, thereby both liberating and augmenting the performance power of the human brain. What effect, if any, does this have on the search for the underlying mechanism that cognitive science is trying to model and the Turing Test is trying to test? How much (and what) cognitive capacity cannot be offloaded onto cognitive technology? 4 This is related-but in a somewhat counterintuitive way-to the difference between what I can do that I know how I do and what I can do without knowing how I do it. It is our implicit know-how that can be offloaded onto technology without our even noticing a difference. Yet it is the explicit know-how that we can verbalize and formalize that is the easiest to offload: because we know how we do it, it is easier to turn it into an algorithm.
In this work we tested conjunctive and disjunctive Google searches for target terms that have their own Wikipedia entries, using either the target terms themselves or the three words that had the highest cooccurrence frequency (latent semantic analysis) with the target words in WordNet. We found that the highly co-occurring words N europsychology and neuroimaging studies have confirmed what we all knew already from introspection: some of our know-how is conscious, but most of it is not. 1 Learning, skill, knowledge, and memory all come in two forms: explicit, in which we are aware of-and can hence describe in S o c i e t y o n l i n e , P a r t 2 were surprisingly ineffective in retrieving the target word and there was no signifi cant correlation with age of acquisition or concreteness. This raises some questions about the similarity between human associative memory and Google-based associative search.
Unconscious Know-How Suppose we are trying to recall someone's name. We know the person and their name, but we just can't retrieve it. And then it pops up. We have no idea how, or from where. When the name pops up instantly, with no tipof-the-tongue delay, we take it for granted. In both cases-instant and delayed-we have no idea how we retrieved the name.
The need for a mechanism is even more obvious when it is not just rote memory retrieval that is at issue, but active processing such as executing an algorithm. For example, most of us know the multiplication tables up to 12 × 12 by rote, but beyond that, we have to perform a computation. When we perform a computation externally, with pen and paper, it is evident what computation we are doing, and we can describe that same computation explicitly, even when we do it in our heads. But there are computations that our brains perform implicitly, computations that we cannot verbalize nor are we even aware of their algorithm or its execution.
Catching a Frisbee is a good example. A robot doing that has to do certain optokinetic computations, as do we. Yet, we are unaware of doing them or what they are while they are happening, implicitly. The same is true when we are trying to recall the name of a face we have recognized; it is not just the nameretrieval process that is executed for us, implicitly, by our brains, but the process of recognizing the face. As attempts to generate the same know-how in robotic vision show, a good deal of computation is needed there too, computation that is again completely opaque to our conscious introspection.
This raises a question about the locus of all the unconscious data storage and data processing underlying our cognitive know-how: How much of it really needs to take place inside the brain? Some research has suggested that when users fi nd an item by searching Google instead of searching their brainware, Google becomes a part of their "extended mind." 5 But does that mean we need to build Google into our Turing Test candidate or just that the Turing Test candidate as well as our human subject should have access to Google? And is what we are not and cannot be conscious of really part of our mind?
We don't just offl oad cognitive processing onto technology, we also offl oad it onto one another's brains. That is, cognition is not only distributed but collaborative. Yet the other minds with which I collaborate do not become a part of my own extended mind. Nor would we want to design a Turing Test candidate that included other people's brainware, any more than we would want to include the hardware, software, or data of external technology that our candidate merely uses.
Sensorimotor Grounding
People differ in their cognitive skills, and the Turing Test is only meant to capture our generic human cognitive capacity, the know-how we would expect anyone to have. The distance between a layman and what used to be reckoned a "scholar" has defi nitely been narrowed by Google (and Google Scholar!), for example. A layman plus Google can answer questions today that formerly only a scholar could answer after a lot of library research. And cognitive technology can even endow average minds with what used to be considered autistic savant skills, 6 performing instant computations that used to take a lot of real time. We accordingly need to ask, what are the cognitive capacities that cannot be offl oaded onto cognitive technology, the ones for which Google is of no help?
The obvious candidate is basic sensorimotor skills. Google might be able to help you improve your golf skills, but you would not want to learn to play golf (or acquire any continuous sensorimotor skill) bottomup from Google, any more than from an instruction manual. 2 The same is true of wine tasting. Some things can only be learned from direct sensorimotor experience.
Language itself is already cognitive technology, and its enormous power is derived from its combinatory capacity, just as Google's is. Once you have grounded the meanings of a certain number of words directly through sensorimotor category learning, then language, books, algorithms, and Google can go on to combine and recombine those grounded words in myriad useful ways. Still, their initial grounding always must be internal and sensorimotor. 7 a layman plus Google can answer questions today that formerly only a scholar could answer after a lot of library research.
External and Internal Lexicon
In earlier work, we showed that any dictionary can be systematically reduced to a much smaller grounding kernel of words from which the rest of the words in the dictionary can be reached through verbal definitions alone, using recombinations of the grounding words. 8 Overall, those grounding words turn out to have been learned at an earlier age and to be more concrete and sensorimotor than the rest of the dictionary, based on the Medical Research Council (MRC) Psycholinguistic Database. 9 Yet, when we partial out the effects of the strongest correlate-age of acquisition-then the residual grounding kernel words are more abstract than the rest of the dictionary. 10 Further analyses show that the grounding kernel consists of a highly concrete core, learned early, plus a surrounding abstract layer that is not correlated with age; hence some of the grounding vocabulary is learned early and some later. 11 We hypothesize that the mental lexicon encoded in our brains is homologous to our external lexicon, in that it too has a grounded kernel of mostly concrete words that we acquired early, nonverbally, plus a further grounding layer of more abstract words. The meanings of these directly grounded words are encoded in nonlinguistic, sensorimotor representations. The rest of our word meanings are encoded verbally, as combinations and recombinations of these grounding words.
For the most part, however, some new words no doubt continue to be grounded directly in experience throughout the life cycle rather than just being encoded as verbal definitions, descriptions, and explanations. Perhaps even some of those words that are initially learned explicitly from verbal definitions eventually become grounded more directly in experience with time. With frequent linguistic use, they could also become "rechunked" into more implicit, holistic units that we would have almost as much difficulty defining explicitly as we would defining our core grounding vocabulary. 12 
Web Searches
The difference between a dictionary and an encyclopedia is really just a matter of degree. We expect more detail from an encyclopedia, and we consult it even if we already know what a word means, should we want more details about its referent. Hence, it is natural to extend to encyclopedias the inquiry into the implicit and explicit encoding of meaning, but encyclopedia entries contain too many words.
In our dictionary analyses, we ignored syntax and treated all the words in a definition as an unordered string of words (ignoring function words). Nevertheless, dictionary definitions proved short enough so that we could converge on the grounding kernel without inordinate amounts of computation.
If we think of the Web as an encyclopedia, almanac, and vademecum, then there are two ways we can consult it for information. One is conventional dictionary-or encyclopedia-style look-up on the defined target term (say, "conscience") for the defining terms ("feeling of right and wrong"). The nature of dictionary and encyclopedia search and use is that we rarely want to go in the opposite direction: from the defining terms to the defined term. In searching the Web, however, this is often the direction we need to go. This is rather like playing "Jeopardy," the game of reverse definitions, where you are given parts of the definition and must guess what is being defined.
Wikipedia as Search Success Criterion
Google uses Boolean AND/OR/NOT search plus a lot of background heuristics. The result is that for many if not most single-word searches based directly on the defined target term, the top Google hit will be the Wikipedia entry for that term. Such a search is successful by all criteria of success if the first hit is the direct Wikipedia entry when an exact Wikipedia entry exists for the target search term.
Wikipedia is an encyclopedia, and one of the most highly used "authorities" on the Web based on the PageRank algorithm (in terms of links and hits). But a direct hit using the target term itself is trivial. The search becomes more realistic and challenging if the search term is not just the target term, or not the target term alone, but rather something we think is somehow related semantically to what we are seeking (when we are seeking, but do not know, the target term). In our brains-assuming that the target term and its meaning are in there somewhere-this would be like cued memory retrieval or the tip-ofthe-tongue phenomenon, where the word associated with the target word we are seeing somehow triggers an unconscious process that retrieves the target word. 13 
boolean "anD" Search
If we were allowed only one search function, it would undoubtedly be conjunction. Suppose you have a partial descriptor, S1, that is not specific enough to retrieve what you are looking for by making it appear at or near the top of the resulting Google list of hits. If you have a second partial descriptor, S2, a disjunctive search (S1 OR S2) widens S o c i e t y o n l i n e , P a r t 2 the search's extension still more, further reducing the chances that the target will appear near the top of the list. A conjunctive search (S1 AND S2), on the other hand, adds the Google extension of S2 but narrows the joint outcome to only the overlap between the extensions of both search terms. As a fi rst approximation, a good choice of S2 will greatly increase the chances of retrieving the target with a high rank. In fact, conjunction is so powerful that it is one of those formal propertiesalongside the law of the excluded middle and the invariants of projective geometry-that the brain would be downright foolish not to exploit. 14 Hence, it is likely that conjunction-based retrieval of the joint associates of two or more pairs of search terms plays a role in the cognitive process that underlies trying to recall or even generate concepts. If so, associative retrieval based on conjunctive search might be one of the processes that can be offl oaded onto cognitive technology. It is the kind of process normally executed for us unconsciously inside our brain. (We are aware of our search terms, but not of the retrieval process.) We should be able to think much the same way if the unconscious processing is done for us outside our brain, if we get the results fast enough.
Offl oading Real-Time Cognition: Language The evolution of language itself was probably the fi rst way we offl oaded cognitive processes that we had formerly executed inside our heads. 7 Looking for a target word? Ask someone. Of course, if your search terms are not enough to win this game of "Jeopardy" in your own head, they might not work in the head of your interlocutor either. You can write to someone else or try looking the word up in books (reading and writing being the second form of offl oaded cognition), but that all takes time, and consulting a printed index for the conjunction of search terms takes still longer.
Cognition is a real-time process, occurring at the speed of thought. 15 So, if mental search is to be offl oaded onto external technology, the transaction needs to take place in real time at about the speed of thought for it to feel like cognition. Language is interactive, with the dialogue occurring at about the speed of live oral conversation. That is the tempo to which both thought and the speed of thought have been biologically adapted. Longer turnaround times are unbiological and certainly cannot be mistaken for online cognition.
That is why googling the Web feels as natural as googling your brain. Might googling the Web externally reveal something about how we google our brains internally in the way that the structure of external dictionaries has cast light on our internal lexicon?
Latent Semantic Analysis
An important feature of word associations is co-occurrence frequencyhow often words occur together in text. Latent semantic analysis (LSA) provides a measure of this form of word-to-word semantic distance. 16 We used the words in an LSA database 17 to generate the three closest LSA associates for each of a set of almost 863 words. That set was in turn chosen from the MRC Psycholinguistic Data base because they had been quantified on the three psycholinguistic variables that had proved significant in our dictionary grounding analyses: age of acquisition, concreteness, and written frequency.
Our selection criterion was that our words had to 1. have a value on each of the three MRC variables, 2. have a Wikipedia page that was devoted to them, as a target word, and 3. have three closest associates in the LSA database.
Starting from the smallest database (MRC) (part 1) and then excluding those words that failed to meet our criteria for parts 2 or 3 yielded the 863 target MRC words T with Wikipedia entries, plus their three closest LSA semantic associates S1, S2, and S3 (2,589 words).
It turned out that the MRC restriction was uninformative because none of the correlations between the success of our conjunctive and disjunctive search outcomes, on the one hand, and the age of acquisition, concreteness, or frequency, on the other hand, proved signifi cant. Nevertheless, the criteria generated a small enough sample, based on wellstudied words, to be tractable for this fi rst analysis of conjunctive and disjunctive search on semantic associates S with and without the target word T.
if mental search is to be offl oaded onto external technology, the transaction needs to take place in real time for it to feel like cognition.
Conjunctive versus Disjunctive Search
For each of the 863 target words (T) we generated a Google search consisting of either the target word alone or a disjunctive search composed of 1, 2, or 3 of its LSA associates S as follows: (S1), (S1 OR S2), (S1 OR S2 OR S3). We also did disjunctive searches adding the target word: (S1 OR T), (S1 OR S2 OR T), (S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR T). We did the same with conjunctive searches: (S1 AND S2), (S1 AND S2 AND S3), (S1 AND T), (S1 AND S2 AND T), (S1 AND S2 AND S3 AND T). Figure 1 shows the results. We defined success by how often the Wikipedia entry for T was within the first 10 Google hits. Search was either on the target word T alone or on each T's three (or fewer) closest semantic associates, S1, S2, and S3, according to LSA of WordNet frequency of co-occurrence with T. The highco-occurrence words were clearly ineffective in the absence of T. Including T improves conjunctive search slightly, and disjunctive search somewhat more, but neither comes close to the effectiveness of T alone. The results were worse the more terms added; they were also worse Figure 1 . Success rate for conjunctive (AND) and disjunctive (OR) Google searches for 863 target words that each has its own Wikipedia entry. We generated Google searches consisting of semantic associates S with and without the target word T: (a) T AND S1, (b) T, (c) T OR S1, (d) T AND S1 AND S2, (e) S1, (f) T OR S1 OR S2, (g) T AND S1 AND S2 AND S3, (h) S1 OR S2, (i) T OR S1 OR S2 OR S3, (j) S1 AND S2 AND S3, (k) S1 AND S2, and (l) S1 OR S2 OR S3. S o c i e t y o n l i n e , P a r t 2 when conjoined (AND) than when disjoined (OR). What was surprising was that both conjunctive and disjunctive search with 1, 2, or 3 of the target term's closest LSA semantic associates alone-the words that cooccur most frequently with the target word text-without the target word itself, generated almost no hits at all. It is unclear whether this is because
• the LSA co-occurrence frequencies are based on a database (WordNet) that is much smaller than Google space, • the Google PageRank algorithm and fine-tuning heuristics override Boolean disjunction and conjunction, or • co-occurrence frequency plays a smaller role in the success of Google searches than it does in human cognition (where it is predictive of word associations and memory retrieval), at least insofar as entries where their Wikipedia page is the criterion for success.
LSA scores are based on cooccurrence frequency, and co-occurrence means conjunction. A Boolean conjunctive search is likewise based on conjunction. The LSA scores in our study were based on frequency of conjunction with the target word (in the WordNet database 18 ), so we would have expected the LSA conjuncts alone to do better than they did in converging on the target word and its Wikipedia entry. As we noted, the WordNet database is necessarily much smaller than all of Google space. Hence, it is also possible that conjunctive Google search is more representative of global conjunction effects in free text than the local WordNet database. (We will be extending the analysis to co-occurrence analyses based on a larger chunk of Google space.)
It is also possible that in Google in general (or for Google Wikipedia entries for direct target terms), there is a tension between a Boolean conjunction and the PageRank algorithm or some of its heuristic fine tuning. It is known that LSA scores are correlated with and predictive of human word-association performance and other psycholinguistic measures. So this divergence is worth investigating further, and we plan to do so with other forms of semantic relations, in addition to LSA cooccurrence, as derived from WordNet, such as synonymy, hyperonymy, and mereonomy. 19 O ne widely held hope is that Google space in general, and digital free text in particular, will be made more intelligently navigable if documents, document passages, phrases, and words are explicitly marked up by creators and users with their semantic descriptors. But what are semantic descriptors? Like dictionary definitions, they too are just words, combined and recombined. Although this study failed to detect any significant correlations with the variables that characterized the grounding vocabulary in our dictionary studies (age of acquisition, concreteness, and frequency), our sample was small, and we will extend it using the British National Corpus. 20 The hypothesis is still that there is a small core of words, implicitly encoded in sensorimotor representations based on direct experience. These ground the meanings of most other words, which we learn through explicit verbal description and definition consisting of recombinations of already grounded words, so that their meaning is explicitly represented verbally. Those same grounded words are also likely to play a special role in Boolean search of Google space. Our hunch is that both combinatory verbal representations of word meanings and Boolean associative search across verbal databases can be readily offloaded onto cognitive technology, but the encoding of the grounding terms cannot.
